What Was in the Doha Agreement

Second, even if the Taliban were to agree to an extension – although they have little incentive to do so, given their military influence and the fact that the Trump administration has already accepted most of their demands – it is unclear what another six months could accomplish in terms of a lasting political solution. The report argues that the U.S. should maintain its military presence and economic support program for the Afghan government until its goals are met, but those goals include creating the conditions for an „independent, democratic, and sovereign Afghan state“ — a goal that has proven elusive for two decades. Restarting the path to peace with new conditions and international attention could serve to reassure U.S. allies that the Trump era is over and that America is back. Admittedly, the Afghan Government would benefit from a strengthened negotiating position. Staying the course would also protect the gains in social and civil rights of the last twenty years. But indefinite participation is hardly supported by the US and NATO public. The war in Afghanistan has so far cost trillions of dollars and several thousand lives for what Army General Mark Milley called a „minimum of success.“ General McKenzie told the committee that the Doha agreement had had a strong psychological effect on the Afghan government because it set a date for „when they could expect all aid to end.“ A day before the Doha agreement, a senior adviser to US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad said the deal was not irreversible and that „there is no obligation for the US to withdraw its troops if the Afghan parties are unable to reach an agreement or if the Taliban show bad faith during negotiations.“ Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin agreed, saying the deal had helped the Taliban become „stronger.“ The Biden administration, in fact, with some amendments, delivered under the agreement signed by the Trump administration, which had not incorporated protection in the event of non-compliance with Taliban obligations in the interest of the United States. Both parties to the agreement delivered what they had agreed on, and both administrations should take responsibility for drafting, negotiating, signing and implementing it.

Indeed, the dramatic situation of US forces and civilian personnel in Kabul does not reflect the position of a government that has negotiated an agreement with the current political force that controls de facto. The situation in which the evacuation of Karzai airport took place appears to be more that of an emergency evacuation from a country occupied by a hostile military power and controlled by a hostile de facto government. It seems that this is the heart of the new US strategy with Afghanistan: the basic concept that the problem of Afghanistan is essentially an internal problem, a „national conflict“ and a civil war between the parties (regional, ethnic or religious) that make up Afghan society, that such a national conflict must be reconstituted through internal negotiations, and that these internal negotiations must include an agreement with the Taliban and are in fact dominated by them. In the absence of such an internal political agreement within Afghan society, it is not for the United States to use its energy, armed forces and budget to maintain a government that does not respect its national political duty. Although these leaders wield enormous power within the Taliban, they have little or no military experience and are therefore suspicious of commanders on the ground. These commanders are usually younger than the Shura of Quetta, mostly between the ages of 20 and 30. Many operate in remote and hostile areas of Afghanistan with little connection or advice from Taliban leaders in Quetta. After all, the real success of the Taliban lies in the military success of these local commanders in Afghanistan. Thanks to the work of these regional commanders, the Taliban now control nearly 50 percent of Afghanistan`s land. They are the heart of the Taliban and many have different views on what a peace deal with the United States should be. The deal gave significant legitimacy to the Taliban, whose leaders met with Pompeo, the first secretary of state to have such interactions. There have also been discussions about whether they will come to the United States to meet with Trump.

„The decision I had to make as president was either to honor this agreement or to be ready to fight the Taliban again in the middle of the spring fighting season,“ Biden said. [1] It is said that other undisclosed parts of the agreement have been signed, but provided that these other documents do not contradict the disclosed part and do not prevail, and provided that this is not the case, the following analysis should also apply to the whole. In addition to setting a withdrawal date, the Doha agreement included radical commitments for the Taliban to take steps to prevent groups like al-Qaeda from endangering the security of the United States and its allies. In February 2020, the Trump administration struck a deal with the Taliban. Under the so-called Doha agreement, the U.S. and all foreign forces pledged to leave Afghanistan by May 2021 as long as the Taliban maintained their side of the deal to 1) start peace talks with the U.S.-backed Afghan government and 2) ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists. So far, the agreement has been technically implemented. Peace negotiations began in September 2020, although they have not yet yielded results. The Taliban also adhered to the letter, if not the spirit, of the agreement by withholding attacks on U.S. and allied forces (although attacks on the Afghan government and civilians continued). However, as the May deadline approaches, President Biden must now decide whether to stick to the terms of the deal and withdraw the remaining 2,500 US troops from Afghanistan or take a different course of action.

The problem is that there are no longer good options. But what happens next remains a problem. Although on March 18, 2020, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan was temporarily halted due to the coronavirus outbreak, U.S. forces have already begun to leave the country. Some in the U.S. question the terms of the agreement, even calling it a surrender document. With a weak government in Kabul and the withdrawal of TROOPS by the US that has provided support, some would say that they supported the Kabul government, others fear that the Taliban will wait for the departure of US troops and invade Kabul, much like they did in 1995.

When that happens, the 20 years of war and the loss of nearly 2,500 American lives will be in vain. By signing the Doha Agreement with the Islamic Emirate, the U.S. government gave its explicit consent to the formation of a new government in Afghanistan that would replace the then existing official and elected government recognized by both the United States and the international community, a member of the United Nations, the government of a country, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Officially named a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the United States on July 8, 2012. The United States has therefore committed itself with the Islamic Emirate to maintain positive relations with the emirate itself and with the new Islamic government after the settlement and to seek economic cooperation with it[3]. The legal nature of these obligations is unclear, as the Doha Agreement is not a treaty or an executive agreement[4]. The key point, however, is to identify the political intentions behind the agreement. After the Doha deal, he said the troop reduction ordered by President Biden in April was „the other nail in the coffin.“ On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, aimed at ending the long war in Afghanistan. The deal contains largely the same terms that were agreed in September 2019 but were sunk by President Trump. Essentially, this agreement calls for the withdrawal of U.S.

and coalition forces from Afghanistan in exchange for a promise that the Taliban would not allow terrorist groups to operate on Afghan soil. However, the agreement is based on several assumptions that will make its success problematic. The agreement presupposes a functioning Afghan government in Kabul with which negotiations are to take place. The recent Afghan presidential election has indeed darkened the cards instead of clarifying who is in charge. The failure of the presidential elections took place last September, but the process of counting the votes was so confusing and controversial that the winner was not announced until February 18, 2020, nearly five months after the election. The flawed and controversial election led to a controversial and divided government in Kabul, leading to an impasse over who is in charge and making the implementation of the next stage of the peace agreement problematic. The result could be that the Taliban, with a weak or divided government in Kabul, will be in a stronger position to dictate the terms of an agreement on Afghanistan`s future that is favorable to their views. „We are committed to the agreement signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United States. We also want the Americans and their allies to support the agreement as well. Instead of making negative comments, it would be better for them to choose the path of diplomacy and cooperation,“ he said. The so-called Doha Agreement was signed in February 2020 and set a date for the withdrawal of troops by the United States. .